Notes: The Uncertain Status of the Required Evidence Test in Resolving Multiple Punishment Questions in Maryland. Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 619 a.2d 531 (1993) by Scott, Robert A.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 1 Fall 1994 Article 9
1994
Notes: The Uncertain Status of the Required
Evidence Test in Resolving Multiple Punishment
Questions in Maryland. Eldridge v. State, 329 Md.
307, 619 a.2d 531 (1993)
Robert A. Scott
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott, Robert A. (1994) "Notes: The Uncertain Status of the Required Evidence Test in Resolving Multiple Punishment Questions in
Maryland. Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 619 a.2d 531 (1993)," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol24/iss1/9
THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE REQUIRED-
EVIDENCE TEST IN RESOLVING MULTIPLE-
PUNISHMENT QUESTIONS IN MARYLAND. Eldridge v.
State, 329 Md. 307, 619 A.2d 531 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
With the explosive growth of violent crime, legislatures are under
increasing pressure to "get tough" on criminals. This political pres-
sure has resulted in the proliferation and expansion of statutes aimed
at punishing criminal behavior.' Consequently, a defendant's single
act or course of conduct is more likely than ever to violate more
than one criminal statute.2 For example, a defendant who robs a
grocery store at gunpoint in Maryland can be convicted and sentenced
not only for armed robbery, but also for using a handgun in the
commission of a felony.' These kinds of multiple punishments im-
plicate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution 4
and create difficult questions for sentencing judges.,
In Eldridge v. State,6 the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered a classic multiple-punishment question. The facts in Eldridge
represent the typical manner in which multiple-punishment questions
arise. James Eldridge entered a bar with a so-called "starter's pistol,"
or phony gun, on December 18, 1989. 7 He threatened the proprietor
with the weapon and demanded money.8 A Baltimore City police
I. See Kenneth G. Schuler, Note, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy,
and the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2220, 2220-25 (1993).
2. RICHARD P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 37.6, at 441 (1983).
3. Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 416 A.2d 265 (1980).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)
(holding that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
multiple punishments for the same criminal offense); see also Dana M. Franklin,
Note, Are Sanctions Imposed Under the Multiple Punishment Doctrine Violative
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Missouri v. Hunter,
27 How. L.J. 371 (1984).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61; see also Franklin, supra note 4, at
371-72.
6. 329 Md. 307, 619 A.2d 531 (1993).
7. Id. at 310, 619 A.2d at 532-33. Although a "starter's pistol" is incapable of
firing a projectile and therefore is not a handgun under Maryland law, the
court held that the pistol was nonetheless a deadly weapon because it was
heavy enough to be used as a bludgeon and was capable of instilling fear in
others. Id. at 310, 619 A.2d at 533.
8. Id. at 310, 619 A.2d at 533.
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officer, however, arrived to interrupt the crime.9 Eldridge was charged
and convicted by a jury of three separate crimes: armed robbery,
carrying a deadly weapon concealed, and carrying a deadly weapon
openly with intent to injure. 0
Upon conviction, the trial judge sentenced Eldridge to twenty
years for the armed robbery, three years for carrying a weapon
concealed, and three years for carrying a weapon openly with intent
to injure." The sentences were to run consecutively, for a total of
twenty-six years.' 2 The sentences were affirmed by the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland in an unreported opinion.' 3 The Court
of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the convictions and
sentences for the weapons violations in addition to the conviction
and twenty year sentence for armed robbery were improper. 4 Six
years of Eldridge's twenty-six year sentence were thereby vacated. 5
In reaching its decision in Eldridge, the Maryland high court
appears to have adopted a new analytical approach to multiple-
punishment questions.16 The court of appeals applied traditional rules
of statutory construction to determine if a defendant could properly
receive separate sentences for violating two separate statutory pro-
visions.' 7 Accordingly, the Eldridge decision signals a move by the
court toward the adoption of the approach to multiple-punishment
questions developed by the United States Supreme Court and other
appellate courts. 18 The problems with Eldridge, however, include the
court of appeals' failure to clearly define this new doctrine and to
fully repudiate the court's traditional and highly confusing method-
ology for resolving multiple-punishment questions.
II. BACKGROUND
Multiple-punishment questions arise in two sets of circumstances:
(1) where a single course of conduct is charged as multiple violations
9. Id.
10. Id. at 308-09, 619 A.2d at 532. Section 488 of Article 27 authorizes punishment
for the common-law felony of robbery, when the robbery is committed with a
deadly weapon. 1d. at 311, 619 A.2d 535-36 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 488 (1992)). Section 36(a) of Article 27 creates the misdemeanor of carrying
a deadly weapon either "concealed on or about [the] person" or "openly with
the intent to injure." Id. at 311, 619 A.2d at 533 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 36 (1992)). Section 36 does not apply to handguns, which are governed
by § 36B. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B (1992).
11. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 309, 619 A.2d at 532.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 320, 619 A.2d at 537-38.
15. Id. at 320-21, 619 A.2d at 537-38.
16. See infra part V.
17. See infra part V.
18. See infra part IV.
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of the same criminal statute, and (2) where a single act or transaction
is charged as violating two or more separate statutes. 9 In Eldridge,
the court of appeals was concerned with the second type of situation.
20
A. Common-Law Merger
At common law, questions of whether a single act or course of
conduct could be subject to multiple punishments were resolved
through application of the "merger doctrine." '2' Under this principle,
if a single criminal act constituted both a felony and a misdemeanor,
there could be no punishment imposed for the misdemeanor.2 The
lesser crime was said to have "merged" into the felony.23
The common-law doctrine of merger, however, was not easily
applied in twentieth century America.2 4 By definition, its application
was limited to cases in which a single act constituted both a misde-
meanor and a felony.25 It was of no use in cases where a single act
was charged as two misdemeanors or two felonies.2 6 Accordingly, the
doctrine was never fully embraced by American courts. 27 By 1962,
19. See Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 324, 558 A.2d 715, 720 (1989).
The first type of situation is typically referred to as a "multiplicity," or the
charging of the same offense in more than one count. See Brown v. State, 311
Md. 426, 432 n.5, 535 A.2d 485, 488 n.5 (1988). The question presents itself,
for example, when a single transaction affects more than one victim. See id.
at 429, 535 A.2d at 487. The propriety of cumulative punishments under such
circumstances is resolved through a court determination of legislative intent.
See id. at 432, 535 A.2d at 488. If the legislature intended a statute to authorize
multiple punishments for a single course of conduct, courts will uphold multiple
punishments. See id. at 436, 535 A.2d at 490. In discerning legislative intent
in such cases, courts will employ traditional rules of statutory construction.
See id. at 435, 535 A.2d at 489.
20. Eldridge's convictions and sentences for two violations of § 36(a) were based
on the trial judge's belief that Eldridge had violated two different provisions
of the same statute-one proscribing the carrying of a weapon concealed and
the other prohibiting the carrying of a weapon "openly with intent to injure."
Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 312, 619 A.2d 531, 534 (1993). The trial judge
saw these violations as two separate and distinct offenses, each barred by a
different provision of the statute. Id. When conduct violates more than one
provision of the same statute, the question is the same as if both offenses were
contained in separate statutes. Brown, 311 Md. at 431, 535 A.2d at 487 (citing
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1958)).
21. See Veney v. State, 227 Md. 608, 612, 177 A.2d 883, 885 (1962); JOEL P.
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 786-90 (7th ed. 1877).
22. Veney, 227 Md. at 612, 177 A.2d at 885.
23. See Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 468-69, 121 A. 354, 356 (1923).
24. See Veney, 227 Md. at 612, 177 A.2d at 885-86.
25. Gilpin, 142 Md. at 469, 121 A. at 356.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 469-70, 121 A. at 356.
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the Court of Appeals of Maryland had expressly repudiated the
doctrine.
21
The court developed "a more modern concept of merger based
on double jeopardy principles" 29 to resolve multiple-punishment ques-
tions. This approach focused on the minimum evidence required to
convict the accused for each offense being charged.3 0 The basic
principle was stated in its earliest form by the court of appeals in
1923: "[I]f the lesser felony is a necessary ingredient of the other, a
conviction of one will bar prosecution for the other." ' 3' In other
words, if all the elements of a lesser offense were included in the
greater offense, the conviction for the lesser offense merged into the
conviction for the greater offense. Therefore, there could be only
one punishment under the common-law bar against double jeopardy.3 2
B. The Required-Evidence Test
In 1962, the court of appeals, in Bennett v. State,33 clarified its
standard for determining whether a single act could constitute two
offenses, thereby allowing two punishments for the single act. In-
corporating principles from federal case law, the court adopted the
"required-evidence test ' 34 from Blockburger v. United States" that
provides: "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact that the other does not.
'36
28. Bennett v. State, 229 Md. 208, 212, 182 A.2d 815, 817 (1962).
29. Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 267, 373 A.2d 262, 266 (1977).
30. Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 266, 353 A.2d 240, 246 (1976).
31. Gilpin, 142 Md. at 469, 121 A. at 356.
32. Id. At the time, the prohibition against double jeopardy in Maryland was
strictly a rule of state common law. Maryland's constitution has no bar against
double jeopardy, Bennett, 229 Md. at 212, 182 A.2d at 817, and federal
constitutional restrictions on double jeopardy were not yet held applicable to
the states until Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See GILBERT &
MOYLAN, supra note 2, § 37.1, at 4432-33; see also infra note 37.
33. 229 Md. 208, 182 A.2d 815 (1962).
34. Id. at 214, 182 A.2d at 818.
35. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
36. Id. at 304 (quoted in Bennett, 229 Md. at 214, 182 A.2d at 818). The required-
evidence test, developed in 16th century England, was first employed in the
United States in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871). The
test was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Gaviers v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911), and in'Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932). See generally Michael W. Prokopik, Note, Under "Required
Evidence" Test, Underlying Attempted Armed Robbery Merges Upon Convic-
tion for Felony Murder: Newton v. State, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 345, 347 n.17
(1978).
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The required-evidence test focuses on the elements necessary to
prove each offense. 7 If each crime requires proof of one element
not required to prove a violation of the other crime, the crimes are
separate; cumulative convictions and punishments are allowed." On
the other hand, if all the elements of one crime are included in the
other, so that the second crime requires proof of only one additional
element, the crimes are deemed the same and multiple punishments
are barred by double jeopardy principles. 9 For example, separate
convictions and punishments are barred under the test for both simple
assault and for assault with intent to rob.40 The elements of the two
crimes are exactly the same, except that assault with intent to rob
requires the proof of one additional fact-the intent to rob.4' Ac-
cordingly, the crime of assault is included within the crime of assault
with intent to rob. Therefore, separate punishments for each crime
are not allowed. Also prohibited under the required-evidence test are
separate punishments for assault and rape, 42 and for battery and
third-degree sexual assault.43 Conversely, separate convictions and
punishments are allowed under the test for third-degree sexual offense
and assault with intent to maim. 4
Seven years after the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted
the Blockburger test, United States Supreme Court rulings made
application of the required-evidence test a constitutional mandate, 45
37. Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 317, 593 A.2d 671, 673 (1991). The required-
evidence test differs from the "actual evidence" test, which focuses on the
evidence actually produced at trial to determine if two offenses are the same.
Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 271, 373 A.2d 262, 268 (1977). The actual
evidence test has been rejected by both the United States Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Id. (citing to Harris v. United States, 359
U.S. 19 (1959), and Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 265 n.4, 353 A.2d 240,
245 n.4 (1976)).
38. Thomas, 277 Md. at 267, 353 A.2d at 247.
39. See id.
40. See Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 717, 421 A.2d 957, 960-61 (1980).
41. See id. at 718-19, 421 A.2d at 960.
42. Green v. State, 243 Md. 75, 80-81, 220 A.2d 131, 135 (1966).
43. Biggus v. State, 323 Md. 339, 351, 593 A.2d 1060, 1065 (1991).
44. See Dillsworth v. State, 308 Md. 354, 360, 519 A.2d 1269, 1272 (1987).
45. In Benton v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969). That same
year, the Court made clear that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the
imposition of multiple punishments for a single criminal offense. North Car-
olina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Under these holdings, state courts
are required to follow Supreme Court standards to determine if multiple
punishments for a single act or course of conduct are constitutional. Newton
v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263, 373 A.2d 262, 263 (1977); Thomas v. State, 277
Md. 257, 267 n.5, 353 A.2d 240, 246 n.5 (1976). As the court of appeals
pointed out in Newton, however, Maryland had already adopted the required-
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and Maryland courts dutifully applied it for several years thereafter.4 6
C. Legislative Intent Becomes Dispositive
1. Merger by Legislative Intent
In 1979, however, the court of appeals changed course. In Brooks
v. State,47 the court announced, in dictum, that the required-evidence
test was "not the exclusive standard" for determining when two
statutory violations based on the same transaction would be treated
as one crime. 4 Following United States Supreme Court precedent,
the court of appeals adopted the doctrine of "merger by legislative
intent" as a companion to the Blockburger test. 49 Under the doctrine
of merger by legislative intent, courts are allowed to determine, using
traditional methods of statutory construction, whether the legislature
truly intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes
at issue.5 0 In other words, even though two offenses might be separate
under the Blockburger test, courts can use the doctrine of merger by
legislative intent to prohibit separate punishments.5
In applying this doctrine, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
looked to a number of factors to determine whether the legislature
evidence test to resolve multiple-punishment questions. Newton, 280 Md. at
267, 373 A.2d at 266. The significance of Benton, therefore, was not to change
the standard used by Maryland courts, but to make the inquiry a constitutional
mandate, rather than a rule of Maryland common law. See Id. at 267, 373
A.2d at 266.
46. See Dillsworth, 308 Md. at 358, 519 A.2d at 1270; Lewis v. State, 285 Md.
705, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979); Newton, 280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262. But see
Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 344-45, 307 A.2d 503, 534-35 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974) (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland holding
legislative intent dispositive in determining propriety of cumulative sentences).
47. 284 Md. 416, 397 A.2d 596 (1979).
48. Id. at 423, 397 A.2d at 599-600 (citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6
(1978)). Although the reference in Brooks to the doctrine of merger by legislative
intent appeared in dictum, the court applied the rule in subsequent cases. See,
e.g., State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465 (1986) (applying doctrine
to merge assault with intent to maim into assault with intent to murder).
49. Brooks, 284 Md. at 423-24, 397 A.2d at 600. In Simpson, the Supreme Court
applied a statutory-construction analysis, rather than the required-evidence test,
to disallow cumulative punishments for a single bank robbery. Simpson, 435
U.S. at 13-16. The Court looked to the legislative history of the relevant
statutes and applied the established rule of construction that any ambiguity
concerning whether the legislature intended multiple punishments should be
resolved in favor of the defendant. Id. at 14 (citing United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971)). As a result of Benton, Maryland was required to follow this
standard in resolving multiple-punishment questions. Newton, 280 Md. at 263,
373 A.2d at 264; see also supra note 45.
50. Brooks, 284 Md. at 423-24, 397 A.2d at 600.
51. See id.
intended to authorize multiple punishments under separate statutes.5 2
Included in these considerations are the language of the statutes at
issue, 3 the statutes' legislative histories,54 basic rules of statutory
construction," decisions from other jurisdictions,5 6 and the fairness
of imposing multiple punishments.
7
2. Legislative Intent Authorizing Separate Punishments
One year after the court of appeals adopted the doctrine of
merger by legislative intent, the court greatly expanded its application.
In Whack v. State,58 the court declared that if legislative intent could
be employed to bar multiple punishments, it could also be used to
justify them, despite the Blockburger test.5 9 In Whack, the defendant
was convicted of robbing a Safeway store in Landover, Maryland
with a handgun. 60 Based on this single act, the defendant received
two separate convictions and sentences-twenty years for armed
robbery and five years for using a handgun in the commission of a
felony. 61 The sentences were cumulative, for a total of twenty-five
years. 62 In upholding the multiple punishments, the court of appeals
52. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
53. See Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 510, 540 A.2d 1125, 1133 (1988), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 835 (1991), habeas corpus denied, Hunt v. State, 856 F. Supp. 251
(D. Md. 1994).
54. See Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 172, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991); Williams
v. State, 323 Md. 312, 322, 593 A.2d 671, 676 (1991).
55. See Dickerson, 324 Md. 163, 596 A.2d 648 (holding that multiple punishments
would be an illogical result). One rule of statutory construction the court of
appeals has used frequently in resolving multiple-punishment questions is the
"rule of lenity." See White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 744-45, 569 A.2d 1271,
1273 (1990). Under this rule, any doubt or ambiguity as to whether the
legislature intended to punish both offenses is supposed to be resolved in favor
of a single punishment. Id. At times, the Maryland high court has used the
phrases "rule of lenity" and "merger by legislative intent" interchangeably.
Hunt, 312 Md. at 510, 540 A.2d at 1133. This creates unnecessary confusion.
As a practical matter, the rule of lenity, as applied by the court, operates as
a rule of statutory construction. White, 318 Md. at 745, 569 A.2d at 1273.
Conversely, the doctrine of merger by legislative intent stands for a broader
proposition-the intent of the legislature analysis controls the outcome of
multiple-punishment questions, not the outcome of a required-evidence test.
See Brooks, 284 Md. at 423-24, 397 A.2d at 600; see also infra notes 58-69
and accompanying text.
56. See Williams, 323 Md. at 323-24, 593 A.2d at 676; State v. Jenkins, 307 Md.
501, 518-21, 515 A.2d 465, 468-69 (1986).
57. Williams, 323 Md. at 324, 593 A.2d at 676.
58. 288 Md. 137, 416 A.2d 265 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 990 (1981).
59. Id. at 143, 416 A.2d at 268.
60. Id. at 139, 416 A.2d at 266.
61. Id.
62. Id.
19941 Eldridge v. State
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rejected application of the Blockburger test. 63 The court ruled that
"even though two offenses may be deemed the same under the
required-evidence test, separate sentences may be permissible, at least
where one offense involves a particularly aggravating factor, if the
Legislature expresses such an intent."6 Looking to both the language
65
and the legislative history" of the handgun statute, the court con-
cluded that the legislature had clearly intended to punish the defen-
dant's single act as two separate crimes.
67
The intent of the legislature had become dispositive in determin-
ing the propriety of multiple sentences for a single act or transaction,
instead of the outcome of a required-evidence analysis. Under Whack,
if a court found that the legislature intended a single act to be
punishable under more than one statute, it could impose penalties
under more than one statute, notwithstanding the result of a required-
evidence analysis." Similarly, under Brooks and the doctrine of
merger by legislative intent, if a court found that the legislature did
not intend to impose multiple punishments under the statutes at issue,
the court was free to disregard the outcome of a required-evidence
analysis and merge the two charged offenses.
69
63. Id. at 141-42, 416 A.2d at 267-68. The court conceded that the two crimes
were probably the same under the Blockburger test. Id. at 149 & n.5., 416
A.2d at 271 & n.5. Nine years later, the court held that the crimes were indeed
the same under the test. State v. Ferrell, 313 Md. 291, 298-301, 545 A.2d 653,
656-58 (1988).
64. Whack, 288 Md. at 143, 416 A.2d at 268.
65. The statute at issue in Whack, the 1980 version of § 36B(d) of Maryland's
Article 27, provided, in relevant part:
Any person who shall use a handgun in the commission of any felony
or any crime of violence as defined in § 441 of this article, shall be
guilty of a separate misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall, in
addition to any other sentence imposed by virtue of commission of
said felony or misdemeanor, be sentenced to the Maryland Division
of Correction for a term of no less than five nor more than fifteen
years ....
Id. at 147-48, 416 A.2d at 270 (emphasis added by court) (current version of
statute at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §36B(d) (1992)).
66. The court found that in enacting the statute, the legislature had amended
several other provisions of the criminal code dealing with handguns, as well
as repealing all local laws proscribing the carrying of handguns. Id. at 145-46,
416 A.2d at 269-70. In adopting these amendments, the court reasoned, the
legislature had dealt with the problem of duplicative penalties and the pyra-
miding of sentences. Id. Because the legislature did not amend § 445(c), the
court found that the intent was not to prohibit separate penalties under both
§ 445(c) and § 36B. Id. Accordingly, the legislature did not intend to avoid
multiple penalties. Id.
67. Id. at 149-50, 416 A.2d at 271.
68. Id. at 143-50, 416 A.2d at 268-71.
69. Id. at 143, 416 A.2d at 267-68 (citing Brooks v. State, 284 Md. 416, 423, 397
A.2d 596, 600 (1979)).
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At the time of the court of appeals' adoption of this approach,
questions remained as towhether the approach complied with binding
Supreme Court precedent.7° Within three years, however, the Supreme
Court made clear that reliance on legislative intent as the dispositive
factor in resolving multiple-punishment issues was constitutional. In
Missouri v. Hunter,7 the Supreme Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution does no more
than prevent courts from imposing multiple punishments where the
legislature did not so authorize.72 Under Hunter, a court's only task
in analyzing the constitutionality of multiple punishments for a single
act is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. 73 If the legislature
intended to authorize punishments under two separate statutes, the
imposition of sentences under both statutes was constitutionally per-
missible.74 The Blockburger test, Hunter held, was not a dispositive
rule of constitutional law, but simply a rule of statutory construction
used to guide courts in their efforts to determine whether the legis-
lature had intended to authorize multiple punishments.
75
Since Hunter, courts outside Maryland have construed Supreme
Court doctrine to require that a statutory-construction analysis-be
employed before application of the Blockburger test. 76 In United
70. Maryland courts are required to follow Supreme Court decisions in resolving
multiple-punishment questions. See supra note 45. Supreme Court doctrine
regarding multiple-punishment questions was in a state of flux at the time
Whack was decided. Prior to Simpson, discussed supra note 49, the Court had
relied exclusively on the Blockburger test to resolve multiple-punishment ques-
tions. See Jeffery M. Kotz, Note, Criminal Procedure-Double Jeopardy Clause
Does Not Prohibit Legislatures from Authorizing Cumulative Punishment for
Separate Offenses Considered the Same Under the Blockburger Test, 13 U.
BALT. L. REV. 179, 184-85 (1983). In Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684
(1980), and Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), however, the Court
implied in dictum that it was constitutionally permissible, despite the outcome
of a Blockburger analysis, for courts to find that a legislature had intended to
authorize multiple punishments under separate statutes. Kotz, supra, at 182-
83. This dictum was not adopted by the Court as binding law until 1983, in
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). Kotz, supra, at 183. For an in-depth
discussion of the development of the Supreme Court's multiple-punishment
doctrine, see generally Franklin, supra note 4.
71. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
72. Id. at 365-68.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 368-69.
76. See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 981 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); United States v. Merchant, 731 F.2d 186, 189-
90 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 844 (1984) (using a statutory-construction
analysis before the Blockburger test); State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39 (W.
Va. 1993) (holding that a court should look first to the language and legislative
history of the relevant statutes, then to the Blockburger test if necessary, to
determine legislative intent regarding multiple punishments).
19941 Eldridge v. State
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States v. Maldonado-Rivera,17 for example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced a typical multiple-punishment
question. A defendant received separate sentences for violations of
multiple federal bank robbery statutes. 78 In applying the Supreme
Court multiple-punishment doctrine, the federal appeals court first
examined the language of the relevant statutes and applied the
Blockburger test only as a secondary matter.
79
3. No Clear Standard Emerges
It is clear that under both Maryland common law and United
States Supreme Court precedents, legislative intent controls the res-
olution of multiple-punishment questions. What remains painfully
unclear, however, is what methods Maryland's highest court will use
to ascertain legislative intent in the multiple-punishment context. The
unmistakable rule of Brooks, Whack, and Hunter is that Maryland
courts are not required to use the Blockburger test.80 Other methods
of analysis are permissible to ascertain legislative intent for solutions
to multiple-punishment questions. The court of appeals, however,
has not repudiated the Blockburger test. Nor has it set out standards
for when the test is to be applied, or when it should be ignored in
favor of other methods of discerning legislative intent.8
In resolving multiple-punishment questions since Whack, the
Maryland high court has relied on a virtual potpourri of approaches.
8 2
77. 922 F.2d 934, 981 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991).
78. Id. at 980.
79. Id. at 981-84.
80. See supra notes 47-75 and accompanying text.
81. The Maryland high court has made attempts to clarify its doctrine regarding
the Blockburger test. In Williams, the court declared that this test is the usual
rule for resolving multiple-punishment questions, "the only exception [being
where] legislative intent to authorize cumulative punishments is clear." Williams
v. State, 323 Md. 312, 318, 593 A.2d 671, 673-74 (1991). This construction of
the Maryland court's position is accurate to a point, but it does not incorporate
the cases where the court has rejected the required-evidence test upon finding
an absence of clear intent to authorize such punishments. An example of such
a case is Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 596 A.2d 652 (1991), decided just
a few months after Williams. In Dickerson, the court rejected the outcome of
a required-evidence-test analysis and merged two offenses because it found an
absence of legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments. Id. at 170-74,
596 A.2d at 651-53; see also infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Dickerson, 324 Md. at 174, 596 A.2d at 653 (relying on the cannon
of construction that absurd results should be avoided); Biggus v. State, 323
Md. 339, 351, 593 A.2d 1060, 1066 (1991) (relying on the required-evidence
test to resolve the question of whether separate punishments could be imposed
for battery and sexual assault); Williams, 323 Md. at 323-24, 593 A.2d at 676
(relying on decisions from other states); Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 597, 614-
15, 569 A.2d 684, 692-93 (1990) (relying on legislative history); Hunt v. State,
312 Md. 494, 510, 450 A.2d 1125, 1133 (1988) (relying on language of statute).
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At the same time, the court has continued to announce that the
required-evidence test is the "usual rule" for deciding multiple-
punishment cases.8 3 This lack of clear standards has resulted in
inconsistent rulings and a difficult-to-apply body of case law.
8 4
For example, in Hunt v. State, 5 the court of appeals held that
a defendant who murdered a police officer could not be convicted
of both using a handgun in a crime of violence and the lesser offense
of carrying or transporting a handgun.8 6 The court noted that the
statute at issue 87 contained no express language authorizing the im-
position of multiple punishments. 8 Accordingly, the court applied
the doctrine of merger by legislative intent and resolved the question
in favor of the defendant.8 9 Yet less than two years later, in Frazier
v. State,9° the court construed the same handgun statute9' as author-
izing the opposite result.9 2 The court held that a defendant could be
convicted of both possessing a pistol after being convicted of a crime
of violence and the carrying of a handgun. 93 This result was reached
despite a lack of express language in the statute authorizing multiple
punishments .94
83. Williams, 323 Md. at 316, 593 A.2d at 673.
84. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has generally continued to apply
the required-evidence test and its companion doctrine, the rule of lenity, when
faced with multiple-punishment questions. See Selby v. State, 76 Md. App.
201, 218-19, 544 A.2d 14, 23 (1988), aff'd, 319 Md. 174, 571 A.2d 1236 (1990).
In applying these standards, the intermediate appellate court has sometimes
reached results that have conflicted with the outcomes reached by the court of
appeals on almost identical facts. See, e.g., id. In Selby, the court of special
appeals applied the required-evidence test and the rule of lenity to uphold
separate convictions and cumulative punishments for armed robbery and for
wearing a concealed weapon. Id. at 218-19, 544 A.2d at 23-24. In Eldridge v.
State, the court of appeals rejected application of the required-evidence test in
construing the same statutes and reached the opposite result. Eldridge v. State,
329 Md. 307, 619 A.2d 531 (1993); see also infra part I1.
85. 312 Md. 494, 540 A.2d 1125 (1988), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991), habeas
corpus denied, Hunt v. Smith, 856 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1994).
86. Id. at 510, 540 A.2d at 1133.
87. The current statute provides, in relevant part: "Any person who shall wear,
carry, or transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, upon or about
his person . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
36B(b) (1992); see Hunt, 312 Md. at 510 n.10, 540 A.2d at 1133 n.10.
88. Hunt, 312 Md. at 510, 540 A.2d at 1133.
89. Id.
90. 318 Md. 597, 569 A.2d 684 (1990).
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) (1992).
92. Frazier, 318 Md. at 614-15, 569 A.2d at 692-93.
93. Id.
94. The court relied on the kind of legislative history analysis it used in Whack
regarding the legislature's failure to amend § 445(c) to specifically bar the
pyramiding of sentences. See id. at 613-15, 569 A.2d at 692-93.
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Because of these inconsistencies, difficulties arose, prior to Eld-
ridge, in gleaning a general analytical pattern of the way that the
court of appeals resolved multiple-punishment questions. Seemingly,
the only constant was that the court almost always applied the
Blockburger test as a threshold matter.95 Once completing a Block-
burger analysis, the court engaged in a traditional statutory-construc-
tion inquiry to determine Whether the legislature intended multiple
punishments in circumstances like those before the court.
96
For example, in Dickerson v. State,97 the defendant was arrested
for possession of a single vial of cocaine. 9 At trial, the defendant
was convicted of violations of two separate statutes-one proscribing
the possession of cocaine, and the other proscribing the possession
of drug paraphernalia. 99 On appeal, the Maryland high court first
applied the Blockburger required-evidence test to determine that
possession of paraphernalia and possession of the cocaine were indeed
separate offenses.100 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the legis-
lature did not intend the anti-paraphernalia statute to enhance the
penalty for possession of a controlled substance. 0'
The court used this same approach in Williams v. State,0 2 where
it held that attempted murder and assault with intent to murder were
not the same offense under the Blockburger test, but merged the
offenses anyway under a statutory-construction analysis. 0 3 This two-
tiered approach was used in resolving virtually all multiple-punish-
ment questions the court faced until Eldridge v. State.'
°4
95. See, e.g., Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 596 A.2d 648 (1991).
96. See id. (applying the required-evidence test as the first step in analysis of
multiple punishments, then resorting to a statutory-construction inquiry); Wil-
liams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 593 A.2d 671 (1991) (applying the Blockburger
test as the first step in analysis of multiple punishments for attempted murder
and assault with intent to murder); White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 569 A.2d
1271 (1990) (acknowledging that the Blockburger test was the first step in
analysis before applying a statutory-construction inquiry in deciding propriety
of multiple punishments for both child abuse and homicide); Dillsworth v.
State, 308 Md. 354, 519 A.2d 1269 (1987) (applying the required-evidence test
before engaging in statutory-construction analysis to determine propriety of
multiple punishments for assault with intent to maim and third-degree sexual
offense). But see infra note 104 (for cases cited therein).
97. 324 Md. 163, 596 A.2d 648 (1991).
98. Id. at 164, 596 A.2d at 648-49.
99. Id. at 165, 596 A.2d at 649.
100. Id. at 169-70, 596 A.2d at 651.
101. See id. at 169-70, 596 A.2d at 652.
102. 323 Md. 312, 593 A.2d 671 (1991).
103. Id. at 322-23, 593 A.2d at 676.
104. On at least one occasion, however, the court ignored the Blockburger test and
went directly to a statutory-construction analysis. See Whack v. State, 288 Md.
137, 416 A.2d 265 (1980) (refusing to apply the Blockburger test where
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In Eldridge, however, the court of appeals ignored the Block-
burger test and skipped directly to a statutory-construction analysis.0 5
Although the court in Eldridge did not expressly disclaim the re-
quired-evidence test, its decision to refrain from using it, even as a
threshold matter, raises serious doubts about Blockburger's status as
the "usual" standard for solving multiple-punishment questions in
Maryland.
III. THE INSTANT CASE
A. Sentences for Two Weapons Violations
Eldridge was sentenced to twenty years for armed robbery, three
years for carrying a deadly weapon concealed, and three years for
carrying a deadly weapon openly.'°6 In analyzing the propriety of the
three sentences, the court of appeals first considered the two three-
year terms, running consecutively, for two violations of the weapons
statute.0 Article 27, section 36(a) of the Maryland Annotated Code
prohibits the carrying of a weapon either concealed or openly with
intent to injure. 08 The trial court ruled that Eldridge had committed
two separate and distinct violations of the statute. The first occurred
when Eldridge carried the weapon concealed into the bar, and the
second occurred when he pulled it out in the open and threatened
his victim.'09
In reversing both lower courts, the court of appeals concluded
that the legislature did not intend a single course of conduct to be
subject to cumulative sentences under this single statute.1 0 Rather
than applying the Blockburger test to reach this conclusion, however,
the court relied on the basic principle of statutory construction that
absurd or illogical interpretations should be avoided."' The court
noted the kind of result that could occur under the trial court's
approach."12 A defendant who, in the course of a single incident, hid
legislative intent to impose multiple punishments is clear from a statutory-
construction analysis). The court of special appeals also used this approach at
least once. See Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 344-45, 307 A.2d 503, 534-
35 (1973), cert. denied, Bremer v. Maryland, 415 U.S. 930 (1974) (applying a
statutory-construction analysis without first using the Blockburger test). These
cases, however, are anomalies.
105. Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 312, 619 A.2d 531, 534 (1993).
106. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
107. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 312, 619 A.2d at 534.
108. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(a) (1992).
109. 329 Md. 307, 312, 619 A.2d 531, 534 (1993).
110. Id. at 315, 619 A.2d at 535.
111. See id. at 314-15, 619 A.2d at 535.
112. Id.
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a weapon in his pocket, removed it, and placed it back in his pocket
several times could receive numerous consecutive sentences." 3 To
conclude that the legislature intended this kind of "pyramiding of
sentences," the court reasoned, was nonsensical.
114
The court relied by analogy on Dickerson v. State,"5 in which
it had ruled that a defendant could not be convicted of violating two
separate statutes, one proscribing the possession of cocaine and the
other proscribing the possession of drug paraphernalia., 6 The Dick-
erson court stated that to construe the statute as authorizing separate
punishments would be to reach an unreasonable and illogical inter-
pretation, under which a defendant caught with a marijuana cigarette
could be convicted of both possession of marijuana and possession
of drug paraphernalia."
7
B. Sentences for Armed Robbery and Carrying a Dangerous
Weapon
In addition to the weapons offenses, Eldridge also was convicted
of armed robbery, for which he received a twenty year sentence."'
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld Eldridge's con-
secutive sentences, stating that the crimes were not the same under
113. Id.
114. Id. at 315, 619 A.2d at 535.
115. 324 Md. 163, 596 A.2d 648 (1991).
116. Id. at 174, 596 A.2d at 652-53. In addition to Dickerson, the Eldridge court
also relied on Webb v. State, 311 Md. 610, 536 A.2d 1161 (1988), in which,
five years earlier, it had construed the statute proscribing the carrying of
handguns, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B (1992), as authorizing only one
punishment for a single course of conduct. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 314, 619
A.2d at 534-35. The court analogized Webb to the facts in Eldridge, reasoning
that § 36 was the "counterpart" to § 36B and therefore it must also create
only one offense. Id. at 314, 619 A.2d at 534-35. The court's reliance on Webb
was somewhat misplaced, however. Webb involved a single course of conduct
charged as two violations of the same statute. Webb, 311 Md. at 612, 536
A.2d at 1161. Eldridge, on the other hand, involved a single course of conduct
charged as violations of two separate sections of the same statute, each
proscribing different conduct. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 311-12, 619 A.2d at 533-
34. When a single act violates two provisions of a single statute, the case
should be analyzed, under Maryland common-law rules, as if the conduct
violated two separate statutes. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
117. Dickerson, 324 Md. at 172, 596 A.2d at 652-53. The court noted that there
was nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative history to suggest
that possession of a vial containing drugs could result in a conviction under
both statutes. Furthermore, the court stated that to construe the statute
otherwise would reach an unreasonable and illogical result. Id. at 174, 596
A.2d at 652-53.
118. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 308-09, 619 A.2d at 532.
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the Blockburger required-evidence test, and therefore separate sen-
tences for each were properly imposed. 19
In reversing, the court of appeals expressly rejected the lower
appellate court's application of the Blockburger test.120 Although the
court stated that the test still remains the "general rule" in Maryland
for determining the propriety of multiple sentences for a single act,
12
,
the court ignored the test and analyzed the case using a traditional
statutory-construction approach instead. 2 2 In concluding that the
Maryland General Assembly had not intended to impose multiple
punishments under both the robbery statute and the weapons statute,
the court (1) construed the statute in a way to avoid an absurd or
illogical result, (2) analyzed the language of the statute, and (3)
analyzed its legislative history. 123
In applying the first principle of avoiding illogical results, the
court noted that the legislature had already provided an enhanced
penalty for using a weapon in the commission of a robbery-the
penalty for armed robbery being double that for robbery committed
without a weapon. 24 Therefore, the court reasoned, to construe
section 36(a) as providing an additional penalty for the same aggra-
vating factor, the use of a weapon, would be to reach an illogical
result.125 "It offends common sense to believe that the legislature,
already punishing the robber for using a deadly weapon, contem-
plated that the robber could receive an additional term of impris-
onment because he carried the weapon used in the robbery."'
' 26
Secondly, the court found nothing in the language of the statute
indicating that the legislature intended the two statutes to result in
multiple punishments for the same conduct. 27 Unlike the handgun
statute, section 36B(d), which expressly provides for separate penal-
ties, section 36(a) does not. 28 To illustrate this distinction, the court
119. Id. at 309, 619 A.2d at 532. The court of special appeals opinion was
unreported. Id. at 309, 619 A.2d at 537.
120. Id. at 319, 619 A.2d at 537.
121. Id. (stating that application of the test "is not simply a mechanical operation").
122. Id. The court declared that the imposition of multiple punishments is 'par-
ticularly dependent on the intent of the legislature."' Id. (quoting Whack v.
State, 288 Md. 137, 143, 416 A.2d 265, 268 (1980)).
123. Id. at 316-21, 619 A.2d at 535-38.
124. Id. at 316, 619 A.2d at 536.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 318, 619 A.2d at 537.
128. Id. at 316-17, 619 A.2d at 537. Section 36B provides, in relevant part, that
"any person who shall use a handgun ... in the commission of any felony
or crime of violence . . . shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor and on
conviction thereof shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed" be sen-
tenced under the statute. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(B) (1992) '(emphasis.
added).
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relied on Whack v. State,29 in which the court used the language of
section 36B(d) to justify upholding separate sentences for both armed
robbery and carrying a handgun.' a0 Unlike section 36B(d), the weap-
ons statute that Eldridge violated, section 36(a), contained no express
authorization for a "separate" punishment.' 3 ' The court declared
that ordinarily, when the legislature intends a statute to authorize
multiple punishments, it expresses its intent in the language of the
statute itself. 32 The court noted that in at least one other instance,
the Controlled Substances Laws, the legislature stated clearly that it
was intending to create multiple penalties for the same conduct.
33
Finally, the court found nothing in the legislative history of
section 36(a) to indicate that the legislature intended to authorize
multiple punishments. 3 4 The court contrasted the facts before it to
those in Frazier v. State,'31 in which it relied on the history of the
statute to find plain legislative intent to allow multiple sentences.
36
129. 288 Md. 137, 416 A.2d 265 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 990 (1981) (discussed
supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text).
130. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 317, 619 A.2d at 536 (citing Whack v. State, 288 Md.
137, 149, 416 A.2d 265, 271 (1980)).
131. Id. at 316, 619 A.2d at 536.
132. Id. at 318, 619 A.2d at 537.
133. Id. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 291 (1992)). Section 291 provides, in
part: "Any penalty for violation of [the controlled substance laws] shall be in
addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction
authorized by law." Id.
134. Id. at 317-18, 619 A.2d at 536-37. The Eldridge opinion does not contain any
specific reference to the legislative history of § 36(a). The court's contrasting
of the instant case with that of Frazier, in which the court used the legislative
history of § 36B to justify a finding of legislative intent to authorize multiple
punishments, however, suggests that the court did not find similar evidence of
intent in the history of § 36(a).
135. 318 Md. 597, 569 A.2d 684 (1990); see Eldridge, 329 Md. at 317-18, 619 A.2d
at 536-37.
136. In Frazier, the defendant, because of a previous conviction for a crime of
violence, was prohibited by § 445(c) from possessing a pistol or revolver.
Frazier, 318 Md. at 603-04, 569 A.2d at 687. Upon conviction for possession
of a Colt .38 caliber revolver, he was sentenced under both § 445(c) and §
36B(b), which proscribes the carrying of a handgun. Id. at 604, 569 A.2d at
687. To determine whether the legislature intended pyramiding of sentences
under § 445(c) and § 36B(b), the court looked to the legislative history of the
handgun control statute, including § 36B. Id. at 612-15, 569 A.2d at 692-93.
Adopting an analysis of the statute's history employed in Whack, see supra
note 66, the court found that the legislature, in enacting the statute, amended
several other provisions of the criminal code dealing with handguns, as well
as repealing all local laws proscribing the carrying of handguns. Frazier, 318
Md. at 613-15, 569 A.2d at 692-93. In adopting these amendments, the court
reasoned, the legislature had dealt with the problem of duplicative penalties
and the pyramiding of sentences. 1d. Because the legislature did not amend §
445(c), the court found that it did not intend to prohibit separate penalties
under both § 445(c) and § 36B. Id. Accordingly, the two offenses did not
merge into one. Id.
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In essence, the Eldridge court recognized one basic principle
emerging from Whack and Frazier: In order for a court to impose
multiple penalties for a single course of conduct, it must find clear
evidence that the legislature intended to authorize such punish-
ments.' 37 This evidence, the Eldridge court concluded, 38 can be found
in either the language of the statute, as in Whack, 3 9 or in the
legislative history, as in Frazier.140 Because the court found nothing
in the language or history of section 36(a) indicating legislative intent
to punish Eldridge twice for using a weapon in the commission of
the robbery, and because the imposition of multiple sentences was
an illogical result, the court concluded that Eldridge could not be
sentenced under both statutes. 141 Accordingly, the court vacated the
sentences for the defendant's violations of the weapons statute.
42
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In Eldridge, the court of appeals faced two multiple-punishment
questions. 43 In both, a single criminal transaction had violated dif-
ferent statutory provisions or portions thereof. 44 The court's use of
legislative intent as the dispositive factor in resolving both questions
was in accord with controlling United States Supreme Court precedent
and Maryland common law.
45
Eldridge is unique because the court of appeals employed, as a
threshold matter, basic rules of statutory construction to discern
legislative intent regarding the permissibility of multiple punish-
ments.' 46 The court mentioned the Blockburger test, but did not apply
it, stating that the test "is not simply a mechanical operation." ' 141
137. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 316, 619 A.2d at 536.
138. Id.
139. Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 147-48, 416 A.2d 265, 270 (1980).
140. Frazier, 318 Md. at 613-15, 569 A.2d at 692-93.
141. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 316-21, 619 A.2d at 536-38.
142. Id. at 320-21, 619 A.2d at 538.
143. See supra notes 106-07, 118 and accompanying text.
144. See supra part IIl.
145. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
146. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 312-21, 619 A.2d at 534-38.
147. Id. at 319, 619 A.2d at 537. The court's bypassing of its usual analysis suggests
that the court may be moving away from Blockburger as the threshold test in
resolving multiple-punishment questions. This seems particularly probable con-
sidering that the court could have reached the same result through application
of its customary Blockburger/statutory-construction approach. Under the court's
customary Blockburger/statutory-construction analysis, as applied in Williams,
White, and other cases, the court first would have applied the required-evidence
test to the separate convictions under § 36(a) for both carrying a weapon
concealed and carrying a weapon openly with intent. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. Clearly, the offenses would not merge because each contains
19941
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 24
By rejecting the established Blockburger methodology, the court
diverged from a large body of Maryland case law. 41 In so doing,
however, it employed an analysis more in accord with the approach
developed by the federal court system.
Under Missouri v. Hunter 49 and its progeny, courts resolving
multiple-punishment questions should look first at the language of
the applicable statutes and their legislative histories to determine
legislative intent regarding multiple punishments. 50 If, as a result of
this statutory-construction analysis, the court finds clear evidence of
an intent to punish both crimes separately, it can forego a Block-
burger analysis. 5 ' Under Hunter, a traditional statutory-construction
inquiry is the threshold test, not Blockburger
5 2
an element that the other does not. The offense of carrying a concealed weapon
requires proof of concealment, which is not an element of carrying a weapon
with intent to injure. Similarly, the crime of carrying a weapon with intent to
injure requires proof of intent to injure, which is not an element of carrying
a concealed weapon. The analysis would not end there, however. Under the
Williams approach, the court could apply rules of statutory construction,
including the rule of lenity. Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 321, 593 A.2d
671, 675 (1991). Considering the lack of legislative intent to impose multiple
punishments under § 36(a), as evidenced by the Eldridge court's statutory-
construction analysis, see supra notes 110-14, the court could have merged the
offenses under the rule. Similarly, Eldridge's separate convictions for armed
robbery and carrying a weapon would also be merged under a Williams-type
analysis. Although the offenses are clearly not the same under the Blockburger
test, a rule of lenity application, based on a lack of legislative intent to punish
both offenses, could have been used to merge the convictions and sentences.
148. It must be noted that to the extent that Eldridge diverges from the approach
taken in Williams, Dickerson, White, and other recent cases, Eldridge re-
affirms the approach in Whack, in which the court completely bypassed the
Blockburger test in favor of a statutory-construction analysis. See supra notes
70-76 and accompanying text. Accordingly, no matter which approach the
court had taken in Eldridge, either the Williams-Dickerson method, or the
Whack method, it would have diverged from previous case law at least to
some extent. This apparent paradox results from the court of appeals' failure
to clarify its standards for resolving multiple-punishment questions. See supra
part II.C.3.
149. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
150. Id. at 368-69; Kotz, supra note 70, at 184; see also United States v. Merchant,
731 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Hunter as requiring a statutory-
construction analysis before the Blockburger test in analyzing the multiple-
punishment issue).
151. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69. In Eldridge, the court of appeals applied the
inverse of this rule. It employed a statutory-construction analysis and deter-
mined that the legislature had not intended to authorize multiple punishments.
Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 312-20, 619 A.2d 531, 534-38 (1993). The
basic approach was the same as in Hunter because the court of appeals used
statutory-construction principles, instead of Blockburger, as the primary mode
of analysis. Id. at 312-20, 619 A.2d at 534-37.
152. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 369.
The approach taken by the court of appeals in Eldridge, there-
fore, complies with Hunter more so than previous Maryland multiple-
punishment cases. The decision is troubling, however, because the
court of appeals failed to properly explain and clarify its doctrine
regarding multiple-punishment issues. Curiously, Eldridge approv-
ingly cited language from previous cases declaring that the Block-
burger test remains the general rule for resolving cumulative
punishment questions.' Yet the court declined to apply the test,
stating that it is not "a mechanical operation."'15 4 This generalized
statement provides little guidance for Maryland trial judges, defense
attorneys and prosecutors. Predicting when the court might choose
to employ the test, as in Dickerson and Williams, and when it might
choose to ignore it, as in Eldridge, is now nearly an impossible task.
This leaves trial judges facing multiple-punishment questions in a no-
win situation.
For example, consider the situation faced by a trial judge in a
case with facts similar to Eldridge. If the judge follows the court of
appeals command that the required-evidence test is the usual rule for
resolving multiple-punishment questions,'55 she will apply the test and
conclude, as the trial judge did in Eldridge, that the offenses of
armed robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon each require proof
of an element that the other does not. 5 6 Thus, the judge would be
justified in ruling that the offenses are separate crimes for which
separate punishments may be imposed. As Eldridge shows, however,
a trial judge following this approach may be reversed.'
7
On the other hand, if the trial judge follows the approach used
by the court of appeals in Eldridge and simply bypasses the required-
evidence test, proceeding directly to a statutory-construction analysis,
difficult questions arise. The cases provide no clear guidance as to
where the judge should look to ascertain legislative intent. In Hunt,
the court of appeals relied on an analysis of the language of the two
statutes the defendant was convicted of violating. 5 8 In Frazier, the
153. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 319, 619 A.2d at 537 (citing Whack v. State, 288 Md.
137, 141-42, 416 A.2d 265, 267 (1980)).
154. Id. at 319, 619 A.2d at 537.
155. See Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 316, 593 A.2d 671, 673 (1991).
156. Armed robbery requires proof that the defendant had an intent to steal. State
v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 606, 298 A.2d 378, 381 (1973). The offense of carrying
a dangerous weapon under § 36(a) requires proof that the defendant either (1)
carried the weapon concealed, or (2) carried the weapon openly with intent to
injure. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(a) (1992). Each offense requires proof
of a fact that the other does not. The offenses are therefore separate under
the required-evidence test.
157. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 320-21, 619 A.2d at 538.
158. Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 510, 540 A.2d 1125, 1133 (1988); see also supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
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court relied on the statutes' legislative history.5 9 In Dickerson, the
court employed a basic canon of statutory construction.' 6 In Eld-
ridge, the court used a combination of these approaches.16' Even if
a trial judge is able to find her way through this maze of case law
and develop a sound statutory-construction analysis, she faces the
prospect of reversal on the ground that she failed to comply with
Williams, White, and other cases mandating that a required-evidence
analysis be used as the threshold test for resolving multiple-punish-
ment questions.
162
There is no need for this confusion. Other courts have succeeded
in clarifying their doctrine regarding multiple-punishment questions
and the Blockburger test.' 63 Maryland's high court would do well to
follow their lead. A clear and workable approach was developed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Maldonado-Rivera 64 Under Second Circuit doctrine, a
three-step analysis is employed to ascertain legislative intent regarding
multiple punishments. 165 First, the language of the relevant statutes
is analyzed using traditional rules of statutory construction. 66 If the
court needs additional guidance, it employs the Blockburger test.
167
If the offenses do not merge under Blockburger, the court presumes
that the legislature intended separate punishments. 6 8 Lastly, the result
of the Blockburger analysis is compared against the legislative history
Of the relevant statutes to ensure that there is no indication of a
contrary intent. 169 This approach is clear, complies with the Supreme
Court's Double Jeopardy doctrine, 70 and would be easier for trial
159. Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 597, 613-15, 569 A.2d 684, 692-93 (1990); see also
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
160. Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 174, 596 A.2d 648, 652-53 (1991) (applying
the rule of construction that absurd results should be avoided); see also supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
161. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 312-20, 619 A.2d at 534-37; see supra part 111.
162. See Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 320, 593 A.2d 671, 675 (1991); supra note
104 and accompanying text.
163. See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 981 (2d Cir. 1990)
(setting out a three-step inquiry for resolving multiple-punishment questions).
164. 922 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991).





170. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 780 (1985) (holding that the result
of the Blockburger test yields to a statutory-construction analysis); Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) (finding a statutory-construction analysis
dispositive, regardless of the outcome of the Blockburger test). The Second
Circuit's three-step inquiry was recently adopted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281 (3d
Cir. 1993).
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judges to apply. Other courts have developed similar approaches. 7 '
By foregoing application of the Blockburger required-evidence
test as a threshold matter in Eldridge, the court of appeals appears
to have moved toward this kind of approach. 7  Eldridge failed to
make clear, however, whether the Blockburger test should no longer
be considered the usual rule for resolving multiple-punishment ques-
tions. The unmistakable rule of Hunter and subsequent Supreme
Court decisions is that courts presented with multiple-punishment
questions should look to the language of the statutes and their
legislative histories to determine legislative intent.'73 Under Hunter,
a Blockburger analysis should be applied only in situations where
legislative intent is unclear from traditional rules of statutory con-
struction. 74 The court of appeals should state this principle defini-
tively and forego applying the Blockburger rule as the threshold test
for resolving multiple-punishment questions. For the sake of sim-
plicity and clarity, the Maryland high court should adopt the three-
step approach developed by the Second Circuit.
Until the court of appeals does so, it is evident that Maryland
trial judges no longer need to apply the Blockburger test as a
threshold matter. Rather, it seems trial judges faced with multiple-
punishment questions would be safe to employ a statutory-construc-
tion analysis first, and to use the Blockburger test only if additional
guidance is needed to discern legislative intent. Judges who apply
this kind of analysis will be in compliance with both Eldridge and
prevailing Supreme Court doctrine.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Merchant, 731 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1984) (using a
statutory-construction analysis before the Blockburger test); People v. Sturgis,
397 N.W.2d 783, 788-90 (Mich. 1986) (looking first at the language and the
legislative history of relevant statutes and applying the Blockburger test as a
supplemental tool in discerning legislative intent); State v. Bickerstaff, 461
N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 1984) (relying on an analysis of the language of the statute,
and refusing to apply the Blockburger test to override the conclusion that the
legislature intended multiple punishments); State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39
(W. Va. 1993) (announcing that a court should look first to the language and
legislative history of relevant statutes, then to the Blockburger test if necessary,
in determining legislative intent regarding multiple punishments).
172. In Eidridge, the court employed the basic rules of statutory construction without
engaging in a Blockburger analysis. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 312-21, 619 A.2d at
534-37; see also supra part Ill.
173. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) (relying on an analysis of
the language and legislative history of statutes to resolve a multiple-punishment
question); United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985) (overriding the
Ninth Circuit's use of the Blockburger analysis, and employing inquiry into
the language of statutes).




In Eldridge v. State,'75 the court of appeals strayed from its
traditional approach for resolving multiple-punishment questions.
Prior to Eldridge, the Maryland high court tended to rely, at least
as a threshold matter, on the required-evidence test to resolve such
questions. 76 In Eldridge, however, the court of appeals employed a
traditional statutory-construction analysis to discern legislative intent
regarding multiple punishments imposed under separate statutory
provisions. 177
Although the court, in Eldridge, did not properly explain the
diminished status of the Blockburger test in solving multiple-punish-
ment questions, the court's decision to refrain from using the Block-
burger doctrine suggests that it is no longer the prevailing standard
for solving multiple-punishment questions in Maryland.178 The pre-
vailing standards are, instead, traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion, as used in Eldridge. 79 Eldridge presented the court of appeals
with an opportunity to clearly set forth the standards for resolving
multiple-punishment questions. Unfortunately, the court failed to do
SO.
Robert A. Scott
175. 329 Md. 307, 619 A.2d 531 (1993).
176. See supra part ll.B.
177. See supra part III.
178. See supra part IV.
179. See supra part IV.
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